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British Policy in the Balkans
1356 - 1878
This work proposes to treat, within the brief period of
time, 1856 - 1878, British policy in the Near East; the conditions
which governed the conduct of this policy; the principles more or
less consistently followed in carrying it out; the relation of this
policy to other nations and its importance to Great Britain.
I shall attempt to describe the attitude of the European
powers in general and of England in particular toward events in the
Near East from the close of the Crimean War to the Congress of
Berlin, whose half-wsy measures left their legacy of strife and
warfare to future generations, resulting in a conflagration which
was destined to spread over practically the entire world, less than
half a century later. The "eternal question" of the Near East was
one of the chief causes of the World War.
A brief sketch indicating, at least, some of the threads
connecting earlier with later epochs of British Foreign Policy will
be attempted here by way of introduction for the narrative which is
to follow.
The first sustained interest of the English Foreign Office
in the affairs of the Near East was England's protectorate over the
Ionian Islands, given her in the Congress of Vienna, 1815. This
in the
effectively made England, for the first time, a power/Balkan.a The
Greek Revolution in 1821 aroused the sympathy of the English people

and there "began to grow up a strong public opinion in favor of
determined action in the Near East.
The Treaty of Unkiar-Skele-ssi
,
1833, which practically
made the Sultan the vassal of the Tsar, in return for the latter'
s
assistance in preventing the encroachments upon the Turkish Empire,
of Mehemet Ali
,
pasha of Egypt, inaugurated another phase in the
Eastern (Question.
^
Lord Palmerston, British Foreign Secretary deeply resented
this establishment of a Russian protectorate over Turkey and de-
termined that the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi should "be torn up. The
Treaties of London, 1840 - 1841, were substitued which provided for
the collective protection of Turkey hy the Western powers, instead
of the exclusive protectorate of Russia,
^
From 1841 to the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, the primary
factor in the problem of the Near East, as it concerned England,
was the increasing mistrust and antagonism between Great Britain
and Russia, England's object was to prevent Russia from turning
the Black Sea into a Russian Lake, immune from outside attack,
across which Russia could easily descend upon Constantinople.
Russian progress toward the South came to be regarded as Russia's
historic mission. Her advance into Asia would be a continued source
of anxiety to England,
Russia acknowledged that Great Britain had a vital interest
in the development of events in South Eastern Europe and Tsar Nicholas
I made two distinct attempts to come to terms with Great Britain,
Hertslet Vol, II, p, 925
'Ibid pp. 1021 - 1024
c
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These efforts were "based on the assumption that the
) Turkish Empire was near dissolution and that it was the duty as
well as the obvious interest of the Powers most closely con-
the
cerned to reach . an understanding regarding/disposition of the
estate, British statesmen, however, felt that the "sick man" had
still a fair chance of recovery^ and they considered it rather in-
decent to partition his inheritance "before his demise. Lord
Palnerston was mistrustful of the designs of Russia and singularly
hopeful that Turkey would recover, therefore the advances of the
Tsar were curtly declined.
^
This refusal was one of the causes of the Crimean V/ar,
in which England, France and Italy were allied with Turkey against
Russia. As a result of this war, in which Russia was defeated,
Great Britain, Austria and France agreed to "guarantee jointly and
severally the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire",^
The Treaty of Paris, 1356, which concluded the war was a
profound disappointment to Russia. It involved a disastrous set-
back to her policy in the Near East, which, since the days of Peter
the Great, she had consistently pursued with three main objects in
mind: to establish her naval and commercial supremacy on the vv'etere
and coasts of the Black Sea; to secure a free outlet to the Medi-
^
terranear;; and to obtain from the Porte an acknowledgement of her
position as chajfnpion of the political and ecclesiastical liberties
of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.
2
'"Hertslet Vol. II, To. 264
2
Marri . p. 279
»
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England, on the other hand, v;ae as fully determined not
to allow Russia to carry out this policy. Her opposition to it
"brought atout a long series of events which led "both countries to
the "brink of a war, cnly averted when Russia, already worn "by a war
with Turkey, and recognizing England's force "behind her threat,
capitulated and acknowleged England's rights in the attempted
settlement of the Eastern Question, It is to these events V7e shall
now turn, and the part the Great Powers, especially Russia and
Great Britain, played in them.
One of the important clauses in the Treaty of Paris was
the Black Sea clause, which neutralized tlie Black Sea; its waters
and ports "being thrown open to the raerc?B.'.«tile marine of every
nation^ and formally and in perpetuity interdicted to ships of war,
Russia was to refrain from having ships of war, arsenals or naval
"bases within the compass of its waters.
The neutralization of the Black Sea was of special con-
cern to England. She had "become increasingly sensitive to the
growth of the naval power of Russia, and the prolonged siege of
SeToastapdl during the Crimean War had made a profound impression
upon the public mind. Therefore, England was determined that
Russia was not to have the complete security which would "be afforded
her "by the closing of the Straits to other nations,
^ Russia, on the other hand, felt that t}ie neutralization
of the Black Sea was an insolent and intolerable interference in the





conetantly acprepsed ^^""^s view that the existence of the neutraliza-
tion of the Black Sea was a '•"blot on his reign".
Such a 1 irritation of the free exercise of sovereignty
by a Great Power did not carry with it the promise of permanence.
Lord Palmerston, its principal author, used to flippantly answer
Russian statesmen, when they objected that the provisionftcould
not last, that they would last ten years. Bismarck characterized
the Black Sea Clauses as ''politically absurd and therefore, in the
most
long run impossible. They were th^inept conclusions of the Peace
of Paris. It was a humiliation which a great nation could not
endure long", ^
It was, therefore, absolutely certain that Russia v/ould
seize the first favorable opportunity to get rid of the shackles
imposed upon her by the Treaty of Paris, The opportunity came
with the bursting of the European flood-gates in 1870,-1 and the
outbreak of the France-Prussian War,
With the fall of Metz , Prince Gortchakoff, Russian
Foreign liinister, addressed to the Powers, a circular, denouncing
on behalf of Russia, the Black Sea Clauses and declaring that the
Tsar could no longer feel himself bound by the stipulations of the
Treaty of iiarch 1856, as far as they restricted his sovereign
rights in the Black Sea,
Prince Gortchakoff, in taking this bold stand, no doubt
relied somewhat on the assumption that England v/ould not intervene.
The latter had no desire to wage war v/ithout allies, against Russia,
and was in no position to oppose her at this juncture.
Bismarc3£
- "Reflections and Reminiscences, "Vol II, p, 114
c
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The Russian Circular evoked strong opposition in England,
Lord Granville, the Foreign Minister, declared that England could
not possitly sanction the proceedings. He stated that no single
power could free itself from any of the stipulations of a treaty
except "by obtaining the previous consent of the Co-sigr.&tories.
^
In Austria, feeling ^^•as divided. The Hungarians, still
cherishing their traditional hatred toward Russia, were ready for
war, "but the Slav races were no less violently in favor of Russia.
Count Beus;t, the Imperial Chancellor, was eager for a conciliation^
and his note, in reply to the Circular, although vigorous in wording
^
contained no express refusal to sanction the course adopted hy
Russia. He had always considered the neutralization of the Black
Sea a "complete mistake."^
Italy could he counted on to follow in England's and
Austria's footsteps, France, entirely powerless in a military
sense, had received the news v;ith general satisfaction as likely
to lead to European complications which would stop Prussia.
^
It was well understood that, although Bismarck may not
have "been privy to Russia^eintentions, Germany had acquiesced in the
step as a "quid pro quo" for Russia's neutrality in the Franco-
German Vyar. "The possit ility occurred in 1870 of doing a service
to the Russian kingdom in respect to the politically ahsurd stipu-
lation which circumscrihed the independence of its Black Sea: Coasts,
It was, consequently, a fortunate thing that the situation offered
^Fitzmaurice, Vol, II p. 73. Buckle Vol (V) p. 130
2Count von Beust Memoirs Vol, II pp. 221 -223
3-
Morley Vol. II p. 35j.
t
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a possi"bility of doing Russia a service in respect to the Black
Sea, We had thus an opportunity of improving our relations with
Russia",! Lord Lyons, British AmlDassador to Paris states that "there
can hardly "be a shadow of a doubt that the denunciation of the
Black Sea Clauses "by Russia was vrhat ie vulgarly\ called a put-
up jc"b "between Bismarck and the Russian government . "2
In this difficult situation, Lord Granville dispatched
Mr. Odo Russell to the Prussian Headquarters at "Versailles as a
special envoy to Bismarck, to gain such information as would ena"ble
them to decide on their next move, Mr, Russell's instructions were
general in character, a large latitude "being left him to act ac-
cording to circumstances and frame of mind of Bismarck.
After much discussion, Mr. Russell finally announced that
"unless he (Bismarck) could get Russia to withdraw the Circular, vre
should "be compelled, with or without allies, to go to war". Count
Bismarck admitted that "if he were in our place, he would not recede".
However, whilst resolutely refusing to allov/ Prussia to "become a
party to the tripartite treaty, Bismarck made a suggestion that
a Conference on the question "be held at St, Petersburg,'^
In the negotiations which followed and ultimately led
to the assembling of the Conference in London, January 1871, after
England's flat refusal to attend the conference, should it be held
at St, Petersburg, Lord Granville in the first place refused to
recognize the separate position of Russia in the matter and obtained
Bismarck's Reflections "Vol. II pp. 114 - 115
Lord Lyons Vol. p. 339
Fitzmaurice "Vol. II p. 73
Busch Vol. I pp. 312 - 313
r
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a practical retraction of the Circular "by the express recognition
of the doctrine "by all the Powers, including Russia, that no
European treaty can "be modified or declared to "be no longer bind-
ing "by the action of one of the parties to it alone, i
However, ae a result of the conference, the provisions
of the Treaty of Paris, affecting the Black Sea, were a"brogated.
While the new treaty contained an article maintaining the principle
of the closing of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to warships,
as stipulated in the Peace of Paris, nevertheless, additional
power was expressly given to the Sultan "to open the said Straits
in time of peace to the vessels of war of friendly and allied powers,
in case the Su^blime Porte should judge it necessary in order to se-
cure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris,
March 30,1856.
The prestit;e of England undoubtedly suffered as a result
of this turn of events and public opinion was convinced that the
country hac surrendered to the threats of Russia, Lord Fitzmaurice
in his life of Lord Granville has endeavoured to show that the Con-
ference resulted in a triumph for England, but as Russia had her
way and established her rif^Xit to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea,
for all practical purposes, the triumph was hers.
Sir Robert Morier writing of these negotiations in his
liemoirs states, "The way in which the Black Sea negotiations
I were carried on and were acquiesced in, goes far to prove that
England has got into a stage of national decrepitude and I would
consider the worst war preferable to this". 3 ^hus the hatred and
^Fitzmaurice "\;ol. II pp. 73 - 76
2lbid p. 76
^Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier Vol. Y p. 293
<
fear cf Russia, which had begun to die down since the Crimean
War, received a fresh stiraulus^and in 187£. manifested themselves
with violence and intensity.
The diplomats, in their negotiations at the close
of the Crimean V/ar, had worked better than they knew. They
had set out to repel Russia and to save Turkey, "What they
really sp.ved was not the effete rule of the Ottoman Sultan, but
the future of nations, which were not yet reborn."^ We will now
turn to the events which were moving with such rapidity in the
Balkans and the part these not yet reborn nations were to play
in them.
At the beginning of the 70' s, almost the entire Balkan
penmsula from the Mediterranean to the southern and southeastern
frontier of Austria -Hungary, with the exception of Greece, still
continued under either the direct sovereignty or the suzerainty
of Turkey,
Rcumania was formed out of the provinces of Moldavia
and Wallachia by the simple expedient of each province electing
the same native noble, Colonel Alexander Cousa, as their Prince,
in defiance of the ruling . of the Great Powers that the two
principalities must remain politically separate.
By the Treaty of Paris, all Russian rights of protection
over the two provinces had been abolished and though the Sultan
still remained th'eir sovereign, he promised to grant an independent

and national administration, England and Prance wished to go a
step further and to recognize the two provinces as an entirely in-
dependent state of Roumania, The two principalities felt that
they were one in race, language and tradition, and should he one
in fact.
Napoleon III had urged their union very strongly and
stated that their "union, hy rendering those countries contented,
and particularly if well governed "by a European prince, would form
an effectual harrier against Russia, whilst the present disjointed
and unsatisfactory condition of those countries would make them
turn always towards Russia".!
Mr, Gladstone expressed himself fully in accord with the
views stated by Napoleon and he urged with characteristic vehemence
that England ought to support the declared wish of the people of
liloldavia and V/allachia, "Surely the hest resistance to be offered
to Russia is by the strength and freedom of those countries that
will have to resist her. You want to place a living barrier be-
tween Russia and Turkey, There is no barrier like the breast of
free ^len",^
However, after Rumania had proceeded to solve the matter
according tc
-her own taste, all the Powers had the good sense to
accept the accomplished fact and on December 23, 1861, the union
of the principalities was formally proclaimed. Roumania attained
virtual autonomy as did Servia, (a principality since 1830) and
Montenegro, although they still remained tributary to Turkey,
Martin Life of Prince Consort pp, 99
I
Morley Vol. II p, 4
r
Hellas was a kingdom, "but only in parts, for a large
portion of unredeemed territory, Thessaly and Epirus, remained
outside the limits of the monarchy as determined in 1830, The
European territory directly sulDject to the Sultan comprised Bulgaria,
Rcumelia, Eosnia, Herzegovina, AllDania, Thessaly, Epirus, Thrace
and Macedonia.
Within these provinces still governed by Turkey, there
existed great diversity "both of race and religion. The adherents of
the Moslem faith usually escaped oppression, while they systemati-
cally oppressed their neighbours. The Christian populations were
deprived of the commonest liberties and rights of citizenship as
understood in Western countries; they had very inadequate protection
before the law; the small peasantry labored under bad land-laws; the
the tsixation was everywhere arbitrary, exorbitant and ruthlessly
collected. Inter-racial rivalry strengthiened the hands of the
Turkish rulers who played off one people and one faith against another.
That the sentiment of England was not entirely with the Turk and
the misrule of his Christian population in the subject provinces,
is clearly stated in a speech m.ade by one of the Members of Parlia-
ment, "The existence of the Turks in Europe is a perpetual source
of irritation. They have never been able to assimilate themselves
to 7/estern r.:anners and civilization. The Turks are today what they
7/ere four centuries ago - a foreign army encamped on the West side
of the Bosphorus, They have made no progress, indeed it is contrary
to their teachings to change,"!
It was hoped that Turkey would take to heart the need of
internal reform, the duty of which had been so often impressed upon
Joseph Conan p, 13-14
cI
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her. The Sultan, under pressure from England, had issued a firman -
the Eatti -Humayoun of 1856 - v:hich guaranteed to every subject of
the Porte, without distinction of creed or class; personal liberty,
equality before the law, complete religious freedom, eligibility for
military or civil office, equality of taxation and the complete
security of property.
^
On paper, it was most satisfactory but - it was only on
paper. The Sublime Porte was in a stronger position at the close of
the Crimean War than it had been for some time, and undoubtedly was
better able to carry out reforms than for many years previous, but
its promises were mere waste paper, "The successes", in Mr, Glad-
stone's words, "by a vast expenditure of French and English life and
treasure gave to Turkey, for perhaps the first time in her bloodstained
history, 20 years of a repose not disturbed by herself or a,ny for-
eign power. However, Turkish engagements were broken for the
2
solemn reason that Turkey had not the resources to keep them."
practically nothing resulted from the issuing of this
above-mentioned firman. The harshness of Turkish rule in the Balkans
underwent no alleviation and, in the absence of constitutional gov-
ernment, revolt was the only vent for pent-up discontent.
In July, 1875, news reached the European Governments that
the Christian population of Herzegovina, exasperated by the extortion
of the tax-gatherers, had risen in revolt. They suddenly refused to
pay their taxes or to perform their accustomed labor services, and,
when confronted by a Turkish force, inflicted a decisive defeat on it.
^For full text see Holland -European Concert p. 329
^Morley^ Life of Gladstone Vol II p,548
r
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For a time the news attracted little attention and it
was assumed that the outbreak would exhaust itself in the usual -
.
Instead, it eventually spread to Bosnia, and it was soon
felt that the Porte had to deal with an insurrection of a danger-
ous type. Sympathizers from Servia and Montenegro began to flock
to their assistance. Things vrere fast approaching a crisis when
the consuls of the Powers intervened with an attempt to mediate
between the Ottoman Government and its discontented subjects.
Russia and Austria were particularly interested in the
v/elfare of the Balkan population, the former as head of the Slavic
family of nations and the self -constituted protector of the Christian
jieople living under Ottoman rule, the latter as a semi-Slavic State,
sensitive to every outside movement directed toward the extension
of Pan-Slavism. Austria's chief danger was from Russian expansion
and Pan-Slavism, The spirit of nationalism, awakened by the French
Revolution, had stimulated the Slavs of the Balkans to throv/ off the
Turkish yoke, Russia was ready to support their desire in order to
fish in troubled waters herself.
Since the Crimean War, missionaries of the new gospel of
Pan-Slavism, mostly Russians, were engaged in an increasing Pan-
Slavic propaganda. In 1867 a great Pan-Slavist Congress was held
at Moscow. Every Russian consul in the Balkan pennisula v/as a Pan-
Slavist, General Ignatiev, an enthusiastic supporter of Pan-Slavism,
was appointed ambassador oo Constantinople.
Austria felt that Russia's aim was a union of all the




Austria's other fear of Russia, "besides Pan-Slavism,
^ss Russian expansion. Austria-Hungary's expansion toward the
South and Ti'est had "become irapossi"ble "by the foundation of the German
} Empire end the kingdom of Italy. Hence only in the Southeast could
she still count on an expansion of her territory and power. From
the 1870' s, the policy of the leading Austria-Hungary statesmen
had taken this direction.
But, in this, Austria had to reckon with Russia, In
order that Austria might maintain herself ^.f- a Great Power, render
her frontiers secure against hostile attacks and in order that there
might he nc restriction on her future development, she could not
allow another Great Power to command the Danuhe and its mouths, and
arrogate to itself the leadership of the Balkan peoples.
In view of this struggle between the two countries and
Austria's well founded fear of Russia, the former naturally turned
to England, who as well as Austria, desired to check Russia's ad-
varce in the ITear East, For this reason, England and Austria cooperated
in checking Russia's policy of expansion and desire for dominance in
affairs of the Fear East,
Russia was not inclined to interpose in this Balkan in-
surrection since it was her policy to encourage the autonomy and
independence of the Slavic population in the hope that they wculd
eventually turn to her, Russia had already v;aged wars against T irkey
^
not only to assist the suhject nationalities of Slavic "blood: and




To Austria, the insurrection was unwelcome , f or not only
was it a menace to her own tranquillity and security hut Count
Andrassy, who had in 1871 succeeded Count Beus"t in the control
of Foreign Affairs **h.Sid. long cherished the hope of seeing the
revolted provinces pass under Hapshurg rule"^. Andrassy was also
anxious to prevent the spread of the uprising to millions of
Austria's own Slavs, Furthermore, his paramount concern was
Austria's self-preservation.
Germany's attitude toward the Balkan question was one
of entire detachment and freedom from sentiment. Bismarck's chief
concern in the whole Eastern question was to prevent it from dis-
turbing the peace of Europe, The only question vital to him was
the interest of Germany and that interest required the maintenance
of good relations among the three Eastern Pov;ers. He expressly
discouraged any inclination to influence in any direction the de-
velopment of affairs in the Turkish provinces now in revolt,^
The Tfhole Eastern question in Bismarck's own words was "not worth
the hones of a single Pomeranian Grenadier",*^
Indirectly the events now taking place in the Balkans
were of great importance to Great Britain, for they involved the
whole question of the future of the Turkish Empire, and with that
the control of the road to India, which, as we have said "before,
had heen from the days of Pitt, one of the chief motives of British
foreign policy, ^ rising in the Balkans would not impro^bahly bring
^Ward & Gooch Vol. Ill p. 92
^
^Bismarck's Reflections Vol III p, 169
'^Reichtag Speech. December 7, 1876 -
r
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alsout the intervention of Austria and Russia ,and at this time^
suspicion and hostility to Russia was the aTDiding influence both
in the English Govermient and in the nation,
England also felt bound by the guarantee treaty of 1856
to continue her traditional policy of the protection of Turkey.
It was, therefore, inevitable that as soon as the Balkan question
was opened, the country must come out of its isolation and take
its part in the councils of the other European powers.
In 1874, the Conservatives, with Disraeli, as leader,
again came into power. His victory marked the defeat of England's
anti-imperali sm which had reached its apogee under Mr. Gladstone's
ministry. The country felt that the Conservatives would be less
narrow in their politics and foreign policy than the Liberals
had been and this attitude was well summed up by Sir Robert Morier
when he wrote on April 1, 1874, "The frequent allusions to foreign
speeches by 'JLt, Disraeli, the cheers with which they were received,
above all, the golden definition with which the present Premier has
once for all rescued the Q,ueen's foreign affairs from the limbd- ' to
which they had been consigned by the shopkeeping class of English
politicians, when he described them as England's home affaire
in f oreign parts, has induced the belief that the accession of
H. M's. present ministers will go far to restore the desired
equilibrium between the forces of war and the forces of peace",
^
Disraeli determined to seek in foreign affairs and above
all in the affairs of Southeastern Europe, a diversion for the
unspent energies of the nation and he concentrated his attention on
this field, because it appealed to his imagination,
^Sir Rober Uorier Vol. II pp. 531-332
rc
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Now, in power, Disraeli set about reversing what he
considered to have been the unimaginative, unpatriotic policy of
his predecessors and his ministry immediately embarked upon a for-
ward policy of aggressive imperialism. One of the first fruits
of this new imperialism was the purchase of the Khedive *s shares
in the Suez Canal, in 1875, In view of this revived interest in
foreign affairs, and England's interest in Egypt though the pur-
chase of these shares, any happenings in the Near East vrere bound
to be of vital importance to Great Britain.
Disraeli also vigorously supported the policy adopted by
England at the time of the Crimean War - encouragement to Turkey
and hostility to Russia, The Prime Minister defended his policy
with the argument that it was not to support the Turks but to
uphold and protect the British Empire. Disraeli, therefore, identi-
fied his conception of Imperial policy v/ith the support of the Sultan
and an almost open contempt for the sympathy of the nation with the
Christians of the Balkan pennisula.^ Lord Granville's objection to
the policy of the Government was succinctly summed up in the state-
ment that he thought "the Turk the wrong horse on which to stake our
money".
^
The British representative at Constantinople at this time
was Sir Henry Elliott. Because of his strong character, unquestioned
honesty and dignity he had gained the confidence not only of all the
Great Powers, even including Russia, but that of the Sultan and his
advisers as well. He vras a constant and trusted power behind the
Ottoman throne and he wrote to Lord Derby, Foreign Secretary, in 1875
that "upon questions of importance, it is to Great Britain and not to





Hussia, that the PoEte turns for counsel." However, Elliot's
attach:nent to Turkey and her interests were, at times, disadvan-
tageous, for it blinded him to Turkish shortcomings.
In accordance with his instructions during these up-
risings, Slliott attempted to restrict the area of disturbance
and to persuade the Porte to lose no time in restoring order. He
felt that the Sultan should "be allowed to quell the disturbance
without outside interference and in this both Lord Derby and Dis-
raeli were in accord with Elliott.-^
Instead of taking steps to redress the grievances and
remove the causes of discontent, the Porte, as usual, did nothing,
even for a time making no attempt to restore order. Meanwhile,
the insurrection spread and the number of volunteers from Servia,
Dalmatia and Montenegro increased, A local revolt now threatened
to become a general Balkan melee. In Servia, national feeling
was seething and it seemed probable that if Servia joined the in-
surgents, Montenegro would follow. In October, therefore, Austria-
Hungary and Russia in a joint note gave the Porte a formal warning
that unless the revolt were speedily repressed, intervention must
be expected. The British accepted the note but expected little fram
it. This note will be considered more in detail later on,
Disraeli now recognized that great events were pending
and he realized that two of the three Powers now desirous of taking
a lead in this Near Eastern Q,uestion, namely Austria and Germany,
had borne no part in the Crimean War, while Great Britain, France
and Italy who had fought on Turkey's side were being ignored.^
^Buckle Vol. VI pp. 11 - 12
^Buckle Vol. VI p. 17
If
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Bismarck, although he had repeatedly declared that he
had no selfish interests of his own in the Balkans, nevertheless
now felt, in view of the turn events v/ere taking that he should
step into the affair. The danger of a split Tsetv/een Russia and
Austria TDecause of their rivalries over Balkan interests, renewed
\)y the oufbreak of the insurrection at Bosnia and Herzegovina, was
a very serious matter to Bismarck. It threatened the very life
of the League of the Three E:7iperors vdiich had come into existence
in 1872, and thereby threatened the peace of Europe. The exist-
ence of this League was furthered imperilled hy the fact that in
the event of a conflict with Russia, Austria would naturally side
with England and Russia would draw closer to France, A division
of Europe into an Anglo-Austrian Alliancei and a Franco-Russian
grouping would place Germany in a delicate position. In view
of these considerations, Bismarck assumed the right to take the
lead in shaping European policy.
In a warlike speech caade "by Disraeli at the Lord Itoyor's
Banquet on November 9th, he uttered a significant warning that
while the interests of the Eastern Powers were doubtless involved
in the question, those of Great Britain were equally important
and added that "if Britain draws the sword in a righteous cause,
if the contest is one vi^iich concerns her liberty, her independence
or her Empire, her resources are ine:jdiaustible,
In September 1375, the insurgents themselves laid before
the European Consul in Bosnia a statement of their case and an
Buckle Vol, VI p, 92

appeal for sympathy. They demanded freedom for their religion,
the right to give evidence in courts, the formation of a local
Christian militia and reforms in the imposition and collection of
taxes and they begged that the Pov/ers would at least not obstruct
their enterprise or assist their oppressor.
^
In an Irade published on October 2, the Porte promised
prompt and general reform, and in a Firman issued on December 12,
the Sultan offered the immediate establishment of local elective
councils, in which the Christians were to take part and a local
"gendarmerie". In the absence of any guarantee that the promises
would be kept, these documents excited no enthusiasm among the
insurgents and only resulted in a further defeat of the Turkish
troops by the rebels. The statesmen of the Continent were equally
skeptical of the "bona fide" of these offers and they felt that
they must intervene. Their intervention was somewhat hurried by
the fact that on October 7, the Sultan had informed his creditors
that his Treasury was empty.
Accordingly, the Sovereigns of Austria, Germany and Rus-
sia took counsel together and on December 3, 1875, the Austrian
Chancellor, Count Andrassy, issued from Buda-Pesth the note which
bears his name.
The Andrassy note professed the anxiety of the Powers
to curtail the area of the insurrection and to maintain the peace
of Europe and it drew the Sultan's attention to his failure to
carry out reforms which were long overdue. Some of the stipula-
tions of the note were: the improvement of the lot of the pea-




of taxes, the application of local tajces to local needs, the
appointment of a conunission, one-half MoEle^i and one-half Christian'^
to supervise the execution of these reforms and those which the
Sultan had promised by the Irade of October 2, and the Firman of
December 12,^
The great question now was whether England would consent
to take part in the presentation of this note, in view of her tra-
ditional attitude toward Turkey. Lord Derby, in a letter to Mr,
Disraeli, asking the latter 's views on the subject, remarked that
"it is too late to stand on the dignity and independence of the
Sultan; a sovereign who can neither keep the peace at home, nor
pay his debts must expect to submit to some disagreeable conse-
quences". ^ Lord Lyons concurred with Lord Derby's views in a
letter written January 14, 1876, "I hardly see how England is to
avoid supporting the Andrassy note. If we stand aloof, we shall
stand alone". 3 Disraeli, as we stated above, was reluctant to give
his adherence to the note and his hesitance was overcome only by a
direct request from the Porte, The Queen stated at the opening
of Parlianent in 1376 that "she considered it to be their duty not
to stand aloof from the action of the Imperial Powers but made it
clear that if they joined in urging on the Sultan the expediency of
adopting such measures of administrative reform as may remove all
reasonable cause of discontent on the part of his Christian subjects,
nevertheless, they intended to respect the independence of the PorteT
l?ull text Hei^l-Jt Vol. IV T5p. 2418~^429'
—
2Lord Lyons Vol. II p, 95
^Ibid p, 96
"^Buckle Vol. VI p. 19
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Her Majesty's Government, therefore, finally decided to
join the other Powers in presenting the Andrassy note, although
not ,
the Cabinet was^nanimous on the question.-"- To the surprise of
the world, the Porte accepted the note with one reservation; that
being the application of direct taxes to local needs.
This, however, failed to satisfy the insurgents who
were hopeful that Servia and Montenegro would join them. It was
clear that unless energetic steps were taken "by the Powers to check
the conflagration, that it would soon wrap the whole Balkan per.iii-
sula in flames.
On May 6, 1876, an outbreak of Moslem fanaticism at
Salonica led to the murder of the French and German Consuls. The
trouble arose over the conversion of a young Bulgarian girl to
Mohammedanism on the eve of her marriage to a young Mohammedan.
She had been spirited away by some Greeks and Bulgarians. A Mus-
sulman mob had collected in the Saatli Mosque and loudly demanded
her restoration. "Unfortunately, by some fatality which was never
correctly explained, the German and French Consuls found their way
into the mosque in the very midst of excited Mussulmans, V/hether
they went there of their own accord to remonstrate and argue with
the people, or approaching the scene of the demonstration, were
hustled into the mosque, will never be cleared up. But once they
appeared there, the frenzy of the mob burst all bounds and the most
violent among them fell on the consuls with iron bars hastily snatbhed
from the windows of the mosque and murdered them on the spot."^
^Ibid p. 2C






This event convinced the Great Powers that sterner mea-
sures must be adopted toward the Porte and it led the three Emperors
of Austria, Germany and Russia to adopt more drastic proposals con-
tained in what was known as the Berlin Memorandum of May 13. The
demands of this note were; the adoption of an armistice for two
months, the repatriation of the Bosnian exiles and fugitives, the
establishment of a mixed commission for that purpose, the removal
of Turkish troops from the rural districts of Bosnia, the right
of the consuls of the European powers to see to the carrying out
of all the promised reforms. Lastly, the Memorandum stated that
if within two months the three Imperial courts do not attain the
ends they had in view (viz. the carrying out of needed reforms)
it would "become necessary to take "efficacious measures foi that
purpose. "1
This note was promptly sent to the Italian, "French and
British Governments. It was accepted "by the Italian and French
Governments hut refused decisively "by Great Britain, who, however,
made no alternative proposal and within a few days ordered the fleet
to Besika Bay, just outside the Dardanelles.
To Disraeli the detailed -nroposals appeared to be impracti-
cable and injudicious and the final threat, in which he recognized
the hand of Russia, was incompatible with the British policy of
maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman E.apire,
He resented, moreover, the peremptory demand for immediate adhesion
to proposals from the framing of which. Great Britain had been
excluded.
2
Mr, Disraeli's refusal to assent to the Berlin Memorandum
created profound disquietude at home and abroad and evoked a storm
of criticism. Mr. Gladstone severely censured Mr. Disraeli for his
^Ke^let Vol. IV pp. 2459-2463 ^^uckle Vol. VI n.24
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failure to adhere to the Berlin Memorandum.^ Lord Granville con-
tended that, even granting the Government to have h^en justified
in rejecting the Memorandum, they were wrong in failing to make
alternative positive proposals of their own. Interesting light
is thrown on the attitude of at least one of the Gref.t Powers in a
letter written hy Emperor William of Germany to Bulow, German Diplo-
mat at Paris, April 13, 1877, an excerpt of which follows: "The
British refusal to support the Berlin Memorandum is responsihle for
the whole present calamity, seeing that England's abstention encour-
aged Servia and Montenegro to imagine the moment ripe for them to
strike,
There can he no doubt that the European Concert was broken
by the action of Great Britain. If the latter had joined the other
Powers, irresistible pressure would have been put upon the Porte
and some terrible atrocities might have been averted. Disraeli's
action, however, ended all hopes of compelling the Porte to grant
at once the much-needed reforms and undoubtedly Great Britain's
refusal to assent to the Memorandum helped to stiffen the backs of
the Turks and make more probable the outbreak of war. Henceforth,
it was impossible to shake the Sultan's faith that Great Britain
stood behind him, and this faith encouraged the Porte to oppose
the collective pressure of the other Powers.
Meanwhile events had been moving rapidly in the Turkish
Capitol in the interest of nationalism and on May 10, the ministry
had fallen to the cries of "Turkey for the Turks". On May 29, the
Sultan Abdul-Aziz, was deposed to make way for his insane nephew,
1
Morley Vol. II pp. 548-549
^Dugdale p. 55 Opposite view - Life of Midhat Pasha pp. 280 - 281
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1*10 took the throne as Murad V. He reigned for three short months
and was then succeeded by his "brother, Ahdul Hamid, who inherited
"an impecunious treasury, an empire torn asunder "by discontent and
revolt, and the reproaches of a civilized world." 1-2
The Powers, wishing to give the new Sultan every chance,
withdrew the Berlin Memorandum. Disraeli considered this a triumph
for his Government's policy of abstaining from interfering in the
affairs of Turkey. "All the Great Powers, Russia included, seem
anxious to defer to England and something like the old days of our
authority seem to have returned, "3
By this time, however, Servia and Montenegro had joined
the insurrection and formally declared war on the Porte in July, 1876.
Nor was the unrest confined to Slavs of purest "blood. It spres.d
even to Bulgaria, which, of all the Balkan provinces, had "been the
most completely absor^bed into the Ottoman system. The last vestige
of Bulgaria's independence had been crushed out by Ottoman victories
at the close of the 14th Century. Here, as elsewhere, the condition
of the subject people deteriorated as the rule of the Ottoman Gov-
ernment became enfeebled and it was to Russia tha.t Bulgaria began
to turn toward the end of the 18th Century.
In Bulgaria, another formidable foe to the spirit of in-
dependence and national! ty^ along with the Ottoman Empire^ v^-as the
Greek patriarch. All the hi^er ecclesiastical offices v/ere held
by the phanariote Greeks and the independent Patriarchate was sup-
pressed. On Llarch IC, 1870, Abdul-Aziz, under pressure from Russia
^Ward &. Gooch "V'ol. Ill p. 99
^Interesting account of Palace Revolutions, lij.dhat Pasha, Chap, III
^Buckle Vol, VI p, 28 & p. 39
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"backed "by a"ble Ambassador Ignatic^tr, had issued a firman recognizing
the separate existence of Bulgaria and creating for it a national
church, independent of the Greek Church, This laid the foundation
for a new nationality in the Balkans, Bulgaria, long-forgotten,
emerged from obscurity and the spirit of insubordination which had
shov/n itself in Herzegovina, "began to infect Bulgaria, On May.ll, ]e76,
some of the Bulgarian Christians defied the orders of Turkish offi-
cials and put one hundred of them to death.
The Porte determined upon a prompt and terrible suppression
of the revolt and v/ithout waiting to parley with the rebels, the
Turkish Government let loose in the disturbed districts, hordes of
its Eaahi-Bazouks , who speedily restored quiet by wiping out v/hole
Tillages and committing unspeakable atrocities upon the unhappy
victims. They were described by the British agent who investigated
them, Mr. Walter Baring, as the most heinous crimes that had stained
the history of a century. He reported that 136 Moslems were mur-
dered and 12,0C0 Christians had perished in this outbreak.
These Bulgarian atrocities, as they v;ere known, created the
prof oundeet indignation throughout Europe, Themost ardent denuncia-
tion of the Turks was contained in Mr, Gladstone's famous pamphlet,
"The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East,'" He vehemently
demanded that the Turks be cleared out "bag and baggage from the
province they have desolated and profaned."-^
He urged the Prime Minister, Beaconsf ield
,
(Disraeli had
been created Earl of Beaconsfield^ August 21, 1876) to break away
from the traditional policy of friendship toward T urkey , and cast in
^Life of Gladstone Vol, II pp, 555-554 Answer to Gladstone- f.;bund"in Life of 7iiidhat Pasha pp. 75-76.
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England* s lot immediately with the afflicted Christian people. This
advice did not coraniend itself to Lord Beaconsfield who, full of his
dream of Imperial England, and anxious atove everything for the safety
of England's route to the East, decided to continue "befriending the
Turk, The Turkish Empire was for Beaconsfield a "bulwark against Rus-
sia in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, He deprecated taking action
on account of events which were common , as he said, in Eastern
Europe.^ It vras thought "by many that he treated the whole affair
with altogether too much flippancy, having referred to some reported
outrages as ""bazaar gossip". His skeptical attitude toward the
seriousness of these atrocities may "be partly accounted for by the
fact that for some time after they had "been committed, the informa-
tion concerning them was "neither ample nor accurate','2 Joseph
Cowen, M.P. states, "I heard every speech by Mr, Disraeli in Par-
liament on this question last session, I do not believe that he
meant to treat the Subject with frivolity or indi ff erence, "3
However, England was shocked at his apparent levity, a.nd
public opinion not only at home but in all Europe endorsed Mr, Glad-
stone's indignation. Though the agitation promoted by IiAr, Gladstone
did not result in inducing the Government to join the other Pov;ers
in compelling the Turkish Government to concede antonomy to the
Christian provinces or to carry out reforms in them, yet it did make
impossible the renewal of the policy of the Crimean War, viz, the
armed support by Great Britain of the Turks against an invasion by
Russia on behalf of the Christian population of the Balkans, ^"^
iBucfeie Vol. VI p, 43.
^Letter to Lord Derby July 14, 1876
Scowen, p. 13
4Rc-e pp. 193-195
-Par.l. Papers Vol. 91 p. 276 Derby to Sir Henry Elliott
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After the rebellion in Bulgaria had been cruBhed, and
Turkey y?as able to give her undivided attention to the prosecution
of the war, the Servian rising was doomed to failure. In August,
Prince 'JAl&n asked for a mediation of the Powers, England, there-
upon, urged the Sultan to come to terms with Servia and Montenegro
and put forward as favorable bases for the conclusion of an armstice,
which, it was hoped, would lead to a settled peace; the restoration
of the "status quo" in Servia, a.utonon^ for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and guarantees against maladministration in Bulgaria, also a com-
prehensive scheme of reform, Ruspia suggested military occupation
of Bulgaria by Russia and of Bosnia by Austria,
Still the Porte held out, but Russia's patience was almost
exhausted and on October 30, Russia presented her utSrimatum; unless
an armstice were concluded with Servia within forty-eight hours,
the Russian embassy v;as to be immediately withdral^^n from Constanti-
nople, The Porte gave way and a breathing space was permitted for
diplomacy to operate,^
The interval cf the suspension of hostilities was utilized
by a meeting of the Powers in Constantinople December 12, with a
view to discerning conditions for a general settlement cf the Balke.n
troubles. This Conference had already been suggested by Lord Derby
who had, at the time of the Bulgarian atrocities, demanded of the
Porte that it should punish the chief perpetrators of the crime
against the Bulgarians and had arranged with the Great Powers that a
Conference should be held by them in Constantinople to devise ad-
ministrative changes for the better protection of the Christians in
Buckle Vol, VI p. 85
f
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Turkey. To this Conference, Lord SalislDury and Sir Kenry Elliott
were sent as British representatives. The latter was somewhat
inclined to discourage a Conference at this stage. He preferred to
wait until peace had been established and then limit the discussion
to the revolted districts. Lord Derby, however, felt that recent
events urged the necessity of impressing more fully upon the Sultan,
the need of proper treatment of her Christian subjects,^
Instructions to the British envoys stated that the Powers
could not accept mere promises of reform by the Sultan for "the
whole history of the Ottoman Empire, since it was admitted into the
European concert, under the engagements of the Treaty of Paris, 1856
had proved that the Porte is unable to guarantee the execution of
reforms. "2 .pj^g Cabinet insisted upon external guarantees.
This Conference was preceded by a preliminary discussion
lasting from December 11-22 to which the Turkish representatives were
not admitted. The object of this preliminary conference was to bring
about an understanding among the representatives of the Great Powers
in regard to the suggestions to be laid before the Porte for the
settlement of the troubles in the Balkans.
The program of reforms as outlined by the Great Powers
and submitted to Turkey proposed: a rectification of the frontiers
of Montenegro to be decided by an International Commission; the
recognition of the status quo in Servia; with reference to Bosnia,
Herzegovina and Bulgaria, Governors-General were to be appointed for
the first five years by the Porte, after prior agreement with the
^Buckle Vol. VI p. 109
%ertsfcet Vol. IV p. 2517
r
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Powers; redivision of the provinces for a.dmini strative purposes
and the creation of provincial and local "bodies; taxation reforms,
including the abolition of tax-farming; the reorganization of the
judicial system and the appointment hy the Powers of two Commission
of Control to watch over the execution of the regulations and to
assist the local authorities.
The attitude of the Tsar was changing from one of im-
patience and irritation to a frank desire for war. He had until
now shown a genuine desire to maintain the European Concert hut
the Turk was rapidly exhausting his patience. The Taar pledged
his word that he desired no aggrandisement and that he had not
the smallest wish or intention to be possessed of Constantinople."^
This announcement of the Tear failed to convince Lord
Beaconsfield who responded with his G-^ild h^II speech at the
Lord Mayor's Banquet, referred to above. The next day, the Tsar -
although unaware of this speech - declared that unless Turkey
ceased to make war upon her own subjects and agreed to accept re-
forms at the bidding of the ^^owers collectively, he would inter-
vene alone and compel her by force of arms. Mobilization of the
Russian army against Turkey was well under way ^ile negotiations
were being carried on in respect to the Conference,
After the preliminary conference of the Great Powers
had been concluded, the representatives of the Porte were invited
to confer on the proposals already mentioned above, Safvet Pasha,
the Turkish Foreign Minister, became President of the Conference,
Hertslet Vol. IV p,2508
r
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"On December 23, 1876, the envoys and Plenipotentiaries
of the Great Power s and of the Porte met in the handsome "building
of the Admiralty on the Golden Horn, in the large hall which had
teen prepared for their reception to discuss the condition of the
Christian provinces in the Turkish Empire Scarcely had the
preliminary formalities "been concluded, when from across the Bos-
phorus was heard the "booming of the first gun that announced the
proclamation of a new Constitution (for the Turkish Empire).
Thereupon, a somewhat dramatic scene - that, no doubt, had been
arranged beforehand - was enacted. Safvet Pasha arose in his
place and addressing the assembled Plenipotentiaries, said, »Gen-
tDemen, the cannon that you hear across the Bosphorus notifies the
commencement of the promulgation by his Majesty, the Sultan, of
a Constitution, guaranteeing equal rights and constitutional
liberties to all the subjects of the Empire alike; and in the
presence of this great event, I think our labours have become super-
fluous'. This little speech of the Turkish envoy was received by
the Assemby in chilling silence. The somewhat theatrical ' coup
had evidently missed its mark,
A draft of this Constitution had been submitted to Sir
Henry Elliott some twelve months before this date and from this
premise, J/ilhat Pasha, who had been appointed Grand Vizier tv^o
months after the accession of Abdul Hamid to the Turkish throne,
argued that although there might have been a purpose in the simul-
taneous occurence of the meeting of the Conference and the a.nnounce-
ment of the promulgation of the Constitution, nevertheless, it is
absurd to conclude that the Constitution was a mere device to defeat
34idhat Pasha pp, 132 - 133
rCI
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the ends of the Conference, The Plenipotentiaries, however, familar
with Oriental sublleties, suspected a trick and refused to be
turned from their purpose. They still insisted that the Porte should
subscribe to a program involving administrative reform in the dis-
puted area, to be carried out under European control.
The stubborn Sultan agreed to the reforms but refused to
compromise his independence by giving Europe authority in his domin-
ion. For a month, the Plenipotentiaries of the Powers tried to per-
suade the Porte to accept the joint program of reform, but in vain.
The Conference dissolved on January 20, with the question still
unsettled.
Some of the European Powers felt that the Porte was sure
of England's support in the crisis. Undoubtedly the Guild Hall
speech of Eeaconsfield had given the Sultan some encouragement.
Furthermore, Sir Henry Elliott, who was considered by the Powers
to be a loyal friend to the Porte, a.ppeared to be lukewarm toward
the Conference, in s^te of Lord Salisbury's sincere attempts to
bring about a peace settlement, A letter from Hohenlole to Bulow
written at this time is interesting in the light of this opinion
of the Powers concerning England's attitude toward the Porte, "Re-
ports from Constantinople ascribe the obstinacy of the Turkish
Government regarding the Conference proposals to the circumstances
that the Turkish ministers are fully informed of the difference in
opinion which exists between the Marquis of Salisbury and Sir Henry
Elliott, upheld by Lord Eeaconsfield, who is e^ncouraging the Turks
in their resistance. This lack of unity in the heart of the British
Government is taken to mean, in the event of war, that England will
not leave Turkey in the lurch,"!
^Letter from Prince Hohenlohe to Barlow, January 14, 1877
r
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Lord SalislDury cr>' stallized the result of four weeks of
futile negotiations with the words, ••The Porte refuses to give any
guarantee for the future^and on January 22 he said to Lord Derby,
••The principal ohject of my mission, the conclusion of peace "be-
tween Russia and Turkey has not been attained, •• Lord Salisbury had
sincerely attempted to further the task of civilization at the con-
ference and for this attempt was severely criticized by Lord Bea-
ccnsfield who said that Lord Salisbury had been sent to Constanti-
nople to keep the Russians out of Turkey, not to create an ideal
existence for Turkish Christians,
Gladstone, on the other hand, commended Salisbury's courses
and referred to him as a statesman who ••has no Disraeli te prejudices,
keeps a conscience and has plenty of manhood and character. •'^
In spite of the fact that the Conference had adjourned with
nothing settled, Great Britain still persisted in her efforts to pre-
serve peace. On I-Iarch 31, 1877, the Powers signed in London a pro-
tocol, proposed by Count Schuvalov, requiring the adoption of mea-
sures for the amelioration, without further loss of time, of the
Christian populations in the European provinces of the Turkish Empire,
The warning added that any neglect to carry out the under-
takings demanded would be deemed incompatible with the interests of
the Powers and would cause them to consider what steps the consequent
situation might call for.
The Sultan energetically protested against the tutelage and
supervision which these demands would impose upon Turkey and appealed
LHorley Vol, II p. 560
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to the provisions of the Treaty of Paris 1856, guaranteeing the
integrity and independence of the Porte, He, therefore, rejected
the protocol, April 10, 1877 and on April 24 Russia having secureid
the friendly neutrality of Austria, declared war on the Porte.
^
Ruffsia had insisted that nothing "but military occupation
of Turkey, "by a European Power or Powers, would "be sufficient for
Christian protection. But Europe as a whole, under England's lead
had refused to associate itself with this policy of force. Bea-
consfield thought, even at this point in the negotiations that
Russia would hesitate. He did not know that the Tzar had taken
precautions in advance to secure the "benevolent neutrality of the
Power be^-t suited geographically for intervention in a Russo-Turkish
War. On July 8, of the previous year at Reichstadt in Bohemia,
the Emperor and Foreign Ministers of Austria and Russia had come
to a private understanding and on January 15 of 1877, a definite
treaty was signed at Vienna between the two Powers, delimiting their
spheres of interest in the Balkans and specifying the terms on which
Austria would consent to remain neutral if Russia invaded Turkey,
By this Reichstadt Agreement, Germany and Austria had
come to an understanding in regard to the partition of Turkey, The
agreement contemplated the development of a number of small, weak
states in the Balkans, but expressly excluded the creation of a
large strong Slav State which would have naturally affiliated it-
self with Russia on racial and religious grounds and which would
therefore have been a menace to Austria, Moreover, by the stipula-
tion that Austria might annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria would
secure the safety of her outlying Dalmatian possessions and would
check the danger from the growing nationalist aspiration of the Serbs,'
^Roae p. TTo 2pay, S. B. Vol. 1. pp. 63-64
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On April 16, Russia had concluded a convention with
Roumania which permitted the passage of a Russian army of invasion
through that state and in which the Tsar pledged himself to main-
tain and defend its existing integrity.^
In a Circular letter addressed to the Powers, Gortchakoff
claimed justification for the action taken in declaring war against
Turkey, on the ground that the Porte had refused to listen to rea-
son and that nothing remained "but to obtain "by force what the
Powers had failed to o"btain "by reason,^
Russia did not want to go to v;ar, but her position was
very clearly defined. Tsar Alexander had proclaimed to his sub-
jects and to the world on November 9, at Moscow that "he hoped the
Conference about to meet at Constantinople would bring about peace;
should this not be achieved f and should I see that we cannot obtain
puch guarantees as are necessary for carrying out what we have a
right to demand, I am firmly convinced to act independently."^
The question now became pressing as to what was to be the
attitude of Great Britain. Lord Derby had continually asserted that
it was no concern of England's and that he was quite determined not
to be drawn into it.^
Mr. Gladstone in a speech March 7, 1877 urged the country
to forsake the estabii <ned tradition and policy in regard to Turkey
and to obey the dictates of honor and justice. He ended by saying
^Ward & Gooch Vol. Ill p. 117
2?arl. Papers Vol. XCI p. 31-3 ITo. 3 - 1877
^Gallenga - p. 377
^ord Lyons Vol, II p. 109
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that, whatever danger to British interests there might "be in Rus-
sian ascendancy in Turkey, the danger must be risked sooner than
that the Slav peoples should continue to "be ground down under the
heel of Turkish misrule, ^
The attitude of the Government had been explained by
Disraeli the preceding August. "We are always treated as if we
had some peculiar alliance with the Turkish Government, as if we
were their peculiar friends, and even as if we were expected to
uphold them in any enormity they might commit. We are, it is true,
the allies of the Sultan of Turkey. So is Russia, so is Austria,
80 is France and so are others, 7/e are also their partners in a
tripartite treaty, in Tfhioh. we not only generally but singly guar-
antee with Prance and Austria the territorial integrity of Turkey,
These are our engagements and they are the engagements that we en-
deavour to fulfill But we must not jump at conclusions so
quickly as is now the fashion. There is nothing to justify us in
talking in such a vein to Turkey, as has and is being at this moment
entertained. The present is a state of affairs which require the
most vigilant exairiination and the most careful management. But
those who suppose England ever would uphold, or at this moment is
upholding, Turkey from blind superstition and from a want of sympa-
thy with the highest aspirations of humanity, are deceived. What
our duty is, £.t the critical moment, is to maintain the Empire of
England, Nor will we agree to any step, though it may obtain for
the moment co>nparative quiet and a false prosperity, that hazards
the existence of that Empire,"^
Morley Vol. II pp. 566-568
Buckle Vol. VI pp. 47-43

37 «
In a speech following the deliates in the both Houses over
England's attitude in this matter of war, Disraeli states that **we
have "been called upon to deal with the largest and most difficult
problem of modern politics. We have "been called upon, as many
eniment statesmen have been called upon before, to consider this -
whether the Ottoman Empire could maintain itself, or whether, after
long and sang^ainary wars, its vast possessions might be doomed to
partition, which probably might affect the fate of Empires, The
policy of Europe on this question has been distinct, and is almost
traditional,. I say, absolutely the policy of Europe and not merely
the policy of England; as it is sometimes described^has been this -
that by the maintenance of the territorial integrity and independence
of the Ottoman Empire, great calamities may be averted from Europe,
wars may be averted,
, ,
and such a disturbance of power as
might operate most di sadvantageously to the general welfare,"^
In a letter from Lord Derby to Lord Loftus, British Am-
bassador to Berlin, Derby stated that "Great Britain does not ap*
prove action of Russian Government in declaring war against Turkey.
The Emperor of Russia has separated himself from the European con-
cert hitherto maintained. It is a contravention of the Treaty of
Paris of 1856, by which Russia and other signatory powers engaged
to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Otto-
man Empire.
The German attitude is interestingly shown in extracts
from two letters - "We must demand of England the exercise of a
benev.olent neutrality toward Russia, It is the only possible course
vdiich can maintain the peace of Europe and confine the struggle
^Buckle Vol. VI p, 120
^arliai-nentary Papers Turkey 18-1877 No. 2
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"between Russia and Turkey".! "Eastern affairs being as they now
are, England finds only two directions in which to move. She must
either cling to her traditional policy of the integrity of Turkey
War
and take up arms for her, as she did in the Crimean/ or she must
divide the Turkish inheritance with Russia The necessary de-
termination is lacking in the British statesmen of today who are
failing "both to protect Turkey »s integrity or to hinder the ex-
tension of Russia's power, "^
Apparently England would neither go to war with Russia
against Turkey nor would she fight in Turkey's defense. The
British Government declared its intention to o"bserve neutrality
80 long as the interests held vital to Great Britain were re-
spected, namely: complete freedom of communication "between
Europe and the East by means of the Suez Canal; the recognition
of Russia of the inviolability of Constantinople and the naviga-
tion of the Danube and the Bosphorue, Gortchakoff furnished as-
surance on all these points.
3
The war between Turkey and Russia did not last long, but
there was much hard fighting. Most people in Russia believed that
the war would be a mere promenade of their armies, but In this they
were mistaken, Montenegro, having been encouraged by Russia's act-
ion in declaring war, again commenced hostilities. June 12 and on
June 22, the Russian arn^ effected the passage of the Danube in two
places.
Roumania furnished the master-key to the field of opera-
tion, since she lay between the Russian frontier and the Danube,
^Emperor William to Bulow April 13, 1877. Dugdale p. 55
Count "Munster (Ger. Ambassador to London) to Prince Bulow
"^pari. p^ers Turkey No. 9 1878 j^ne 28, 187
i
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"beyond vi^ich stretched Bulgaria and the Balkans, with Turkey
proper on the Southern side. The principality was still a vassal
state of the OttO'Tian Empire and Turkey, regarding the Russian
convention with Roumania as a violation of the Treaty of Paris,
"began at once the bombardment of Kalafat on the Danube. There-
upon, Prince Charles of Roumania declared war and simultaneously
his country *s independence on May 21.
Reaching the Balkans, after the passage of the Danube,
the invading armies forced the Shipka Pass, and its progress was
for a time so rapid that a continuous march to Adrianople and even
Constantinople seemed possible.
With a change in the Turkish military command came a turn
in the fortunes of war, Osman Pasha, the only really capable gen-
eral in the Turkish army, occupied Plevna, dug himself in and held
the Russian hosts at bay. Further advance became impossible until
this strong position had been reduced, and its siege began on July 20.
The siege of Plevna lasted four months but eventually
Osman Pasha* s resistance was worn down and he was forced to surren-
der with his gallant garrison December 10, having, however, in-
flicted heavy losses on both the Russian and Roumanian armie.s.
In the meantime, the Russians and their Allies jWoh"^ new
successes in other parts of the theatre of war. Every attempt of
the Turks to take Shipka Pass failed, Servia joined forces in
December, In Asia Minor the campaign had gone altogether against
the Turks.
In the fall of Plevna, Turkey knew that the end could
not be far off. Peace now became indispensable to her, whose armies,
demoralized by a succession of defeats, were incapable of resisting





occupied "by Russian troops. The 3ervs and Montenegrins were mul-
tiplying their successes, Turkey, having appealed in vain to Eng-
land for aid in her extremity, came to realize at last that the
only tie "between the two informal allies was that of British in-
terests, not of Turkish, Despairing of any help from England,
Turkey reached a basis of agreement with Russia at Adrianople on
January 31 and on March 3, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed,
Constantinople now lay at the mercy of the Russians and
the fear indiich had haunted British statesmen for nearly a century
seemed about to be realized. However, for the first time, during
this troubled period, there was a prospect for England of a serious
ally in resisting Russian advance. Neither in the Reichstadt agree-
ment of 1876 nor in the Vienna Treaty of 1877 had Austria carried
her policy of hypothetical partition so far as to adipit of Russian
occupation of Constantinople and the Straits. She, like England,
was at last gravely alarmed that this danger was imminent, and she
seemed to be ready to join England in preventing it. Constantinople,
itself would have fallen before Russia, had it not been for the
rising jealousy of Austria and the determined hostility of Great
Britain.
As Turkish resistance collapsed, it became inore and more
evident that there was nothing to prevent the Russians from exacting
any terms they chose. The Porte had already recognized its defeat
and had asked the other Powers of Europe to mediate with the enemy,
but they declined. Great Britain was then asked to perform that ser-
vice and she put the belligerents into direct communication; for the
Tsar refused to negotiate with a third party.
^
^Ward ec Gooch Vol, III p. 121
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Disraeli's olDject, now more than ever, was to prevent
Russian occupation of Constantinople. Parliainent was called to-
gether earlier than usual. The Cabinet, however, was far from being
of one mind. The Government, for months, had heen entreating the
Sultan to allow a British squadron to enter the Dardanelles hut he
had declined. Lord Derby had pressed the Russian Government to give
assurance that no attempt would be made to occupy the capital or the
Dardanelles and was told that it had never been the Tsar's intention
to seize Constantinople, but that if Turkey insisted on prolonging
the war, he would claim complete freedom of action which is the right
of every belligerent state. A renewed promise was made that British
interests, as defined, at the beginning of the war, would be re-
spected. The Emperors reply did not entirely reassure the Cabinet
as to true intention of the Russian ruler and at a Cabinet meeting
on January 12, Lord Beaconsfield proposed that the fleet he sent to
the Dardanelles, a measure to which Lord Derby and Lord Carnavon,
Secretary to the Colonies, offered strong opposition. Lord Derby,
especially, protested and in a letter of January 16, stated, "I can-
not put too strongly the objections Tn^ich I feel to the sending up
of the fleet," On January 15, he had forwarded a minute which was
read at the Cabinet meeting on January 16, in which he summed up
his objections in the sentence,"! object to the proposed step as
contrary to the Treaty, as increasing the risk of collision with
Russia, as tending to irritate rather than conciliate and, as being,
as far as I ean judge useles in a military point of view.
A split was only prevented by the adoption of Lord Salisbury's ajnend-
ment to ask the Tsar's aanction to the movement of the British fleet,
which was refused.
'•Buckle Vol. VI pp. 220-221

Impatient at the restraint placed on her trusted Prime
Minister, the Q,ueen denounced "the great "barlDarians" (the Russians),
the "low tonfe"of the country and the Cabinet itself of which she
was "utterly ashamed". The Queen urged an immediate declaration of
war on Russia.
^
For several weeks war between England and Russia seemed
to hang "by a thread. The war spirit in England was a form of
"Jingoism" and the music hall refrain of the moment was - "We don't
want to fight, hut "by Jingo, if we do - vje've got the ships, we've
got the men, we've got the money, too,"
The sending of the fleet to the Dardanelles "brought to a
head the growing division in the Cabinet. Lord Carnavon and Lord
Derby both tendered their resignations. Lord Derby was persuaded
by Lord Beaconsfied to remain to which the Queen gave reluctant con-
sent. Lord Derby had been for the last few months reduced in regard
to the Eastern Question al:nost to a pQsition of under-secretary
,
serving the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, The Queen and Disraeli
had practically taken the control of Foreign affairs out of Lord
Derby ' s hands.
At the urgent request of Mr, Lay^rd, their British Ambassa-
dor at Constantinople, (having replaced Sir Henry Elliott^ the Cabinet
decided, February 7, to dispatch a division of the fleet to the Sea
of Marmora for "the protection of life and property," Russia's reply
was to advance thirty miles nearer to Constantinople,
11
Mr. Lay^rd, who had "been a Foreign Under-Secretary under
Palnierston, had every sympathy for the tradi ti onal policy of treat-
ing the Eastern Q,uestion. He tried to reassure the Sultan that
England still could "be counted on for assistance. The Grand Vizier,
however, bitterly condemned what he considered Great Britain* s faith-
lessness and treachery in the present situation. When the Sultan
"begged tlie British Government for the last word on the subject of
what assistance he might reasonably expect from Great Britain in
this crisis, Lord Derby instructed Layard to inform the Porte that
he was not prepared under the existing circumstances to incur
the responsibility of advising an armed resistance to the entry
of Russian troops into Constantinople,
Lord Beaconsfitld had led his country to the brink of
war, and his followers now wanted him to follow up his bold declara-
tion with deeds. He had raised the expectation that the occupation
of Constantinople would be regarded as a "casus belli" but now,
when the danger seemed imminent, he had to admit that Russia was
quite within her rights.^ He, therefore, sought and obtained from
Russia a promise that she would not occupy Gallipoli on condition
that Great Britain refrained from landing troops on Turkish territory
either in Europe or Asia.^
On March 3, 1878, as we have before stated. Peace Pre-
liminaries were signed on behalf of the belligerent Powers by General
Ignatieff and Safvet Pasha at San Stefano, a small town near Constan-
tinople.
The terras of this very importaht treaty which was torn up
^Buckle Vol. VI p. 150
^Hertslet Vol. IV p. 517
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iDy the Congress of Berlin were as follows: Constantinople, the
province of Thrace, Adrianople were left in possession of the Turks;
Servia, Iitontenegro and Roumania were to be independent states; Bosnia
and Herzegovina were to "be autonomion institutions, subject to the
Porte; the reforms recommended to the Porte at the Conference of
Constantinople being immediately introduced, to be executed under
the joint control of Russia and Austria; in Asia, Kars, Batum, Ar-
dakan, Bayezid and other parts were ceded to Russia; a war indemnity
of 512,000,000 was to be paid by Turkey, Turkey also ceded to Rus-
sia large parts of .Armenia and Dobrudja, the latter to be given to
Roumania in return for the part of Bessarabia which Russia had ceded
Roumania in 1856.
The nost important provision, of the Treaty of San Stefano,
however, was the creation of a "Big Bulgaria" which was, in effect,
the revival of the medieval Bulgarian Empire as it existed in the
days of Tsar Simeon, before the Turkish Conquest, and was to extend
from the Danube to the Aegean, nearly as far south as Media on the
Black Sea and Adrianople, and to include on the west the district
around Monastir. This was to remain tributary to the Porte but was
to receive a Christian price, separate administration and milita,
a Russian Cornmissary with 50,000 men was to remain in the country
two years,
^
Petitions promptly rained in upon the British Government
from nationalities who felt that their interests had been overlooked
in the Treaty. Greece and Roumania, especially, felt that they had
been ignored and Roumania was prepared to go to war at once with
Russia, if Great Britain would take the lead. 2 Lord Beaconsfiedl
was most emphatic in the d enunciatio n of the Treaty for he feared




the danger to the Otto-nan B'^pire of a Greater Bulgaria subject to
control from St. Petersburg, and the menace to British interests
in Asia Minior, The Treaty of San Stefano completely abolishes
the dominion of the Ottoman Empire in Europe; it creates a large
state, which, under the name of Bulgaria is inhabited by many races
not Bulgarian. "1
Austria was equally opposed to the Treaty as ignoring her
claims in reg; rd to Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been assured
her by Russia in their secret agreement at the commencement of the
war, preparing the war for the creation of a powerful Slav State,
and, in consequence of the proposed enlargement of Bulgaria, block-
ing the road to the Aegean Sea, Even France was alarmed by the
prospect of a Russian naval base on the eastern side of the Medi-
terranean.
Discussion betv/een Austria and England had already been
proceeding for some time as to how far Turkey and Russia were to be
allowed to settle matters alone, A proposal for a European Congress
first at Vienna, then at Berlin, had been accepted by Prince Gortcha-
koff on behalf of the Russian Empire, The point being argued at the
moment was whether the whole Russian-Turkish agreement should be
discussed by the Congress or only those of its claims which Russia
choB€ to submit. Prince Gortchakoff replied in a curt and haughty
manner, indicating that he would restrict the discussion.
Lord Salisbury was now Foreign Secretary, having succeeded
Lord Derby v/?ien the latter resigned at the cmlling out of the reserves
and the proposal of the Cabinet to dispatch 7,000 Indian tx*oops to
Malta on March 27, after the receipt of Gortchakoff s reply. This
^Buckle Vol, VI p. 25S
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"bold stroke was denounced as illegal and unconstitutional and
Lord Derty declared that it was inconsistent with his idea of the
settling of the affair, therefore there was nothing left for him
to do "but to resign.
Lord SalisToury's first official act v/as to issue a Cir-
cular to all the Powers, criticizing the proposals of the San
Stefano Treaty and stating the attitude and policy of the British
Government with perfect definiteness and clarity, Ijord Salisbury
recalled the fact that in the Declaration annexed to the First
Protocol of the London Conference of 1871, the Signatorj^ powers
affirmed it to be "an essential principle of the lav; of nations
that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a
treaty, or modify the stipulations, thereof, unless with the
consent of the contracting Powers, by means of an amicable arrange-
ment," It was impossible, he said, v/ithout violating the spirit
of this Declaration, to acquiesce in the withdrav/al from the cog-
nizance of the Powers of any Articles of the Trea.ty of San Stefano
¥*iich modified existing arrangements or were inconsistent v/ith them.
He then passed to an examination of the stipulations of
the Treaty of San Stefano in detail. By the article erecting the
new Bulgaria, a strong Slav State v/ould be created under the aus-
pices and control of Russia, possessing important harbors upon the
shores of the Black Sea and the Archipelago, and conferring upon
that Power a preponderating influence over both the political and
commercial relations in those seas. The provisions by which the
nev/ state was to be subjected to a fuler which Russia would practi-
cally choose, its administration frammed by a Russian commissary and
the first workings of its institutions commenced, under the control
0^
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of a Russian army, sufficiently indicated the political system
of which it was to form a part,^
He further remarked that the compulsory alienation of
Bessaratia from Roumania and the extension of Bulgaria to the
shores of the Black Sea and the acqusition of the important
harhor of Batum would make the rule of the Russian Government
dominant over all the vicinity of the Black Sea,. Salisbury con-
cluded his Circular vdth the statement that neither the interests
which Her Majesty's Government were specially iDound to guard, nor
the well-being of the regions v;ith which the treaty deals, v;ould he
consulted "by a Congress whose deliberations were to he restricted
by such reservations as those laid down by Prince Gortchakoff in
2his most recent communication.
This dispatch was practically an ultimatum to Russia,
Either the San Stefano Treaty would be discussed as a whole or
Russia and England v;ould go to war, Russia, realizing that the
Salisbury Circular was backed up by 7,000 Indian troops at Malts,
capitulated and agreed to submit the treaty as a whole to a Con-
gress of the Great Powers,
Bismarclc had now begun to take a more decided stand by
the side of Great Britain and Austria, The latter felt that Russia
had played her false by the Treaty of San Stefano, and had accord-
ingly dispatched an army of observation to the Carpathians, at the
time that England sent a part of her fleet to the Sea of Marmora,
Bismarck now offered to act as an "honest broker" in settling the
differences between the Great ^oweis and Russia in regard to the
iLady G. Cecil Vol. II pp. 226-227
^Lord Newton Vol. II pp. 152-133
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Treaty of San Stefano, and he issued invitations to the Congress
of Berlin, whose first session was held on June 13, 1878,
All the Great Powers, together with Turkey, sent as
Plenipotentiaries, leading ministers of the state. Great Britain
was represented "by Lord Beaconsf i eld , now seventy-three years
of age and handicapped ty poor health, Lord Salisbury and Odo
Russell; Germany "by Hohenlohe, future Chancellcr, Bulow and Bismarck;
Hu 5 B i
a
,
"by Prince Gortchakoff , who like Beacc -isfield was handicapped
"by old age and ill health, ard Count ShuvaloT; AuBtria-Kungary "by
Count Andrassy and Count Kar-olyi ; France by 'dr, Waddington; Italy
hy Count Corte, and Turkey by Alexander Karatheodori Pasha and
Mehemet Ali Pasha, None of the small states whose interests were
most directly affected were allowed representation; only Delegates
from Roumania and Greece v/ere heard when questions affecting these
countries rose. The Presidency of the Conference fell to Bismarck,
Among all these rencwned and forceful personalities, one
figure stands out preeminent. This Congress \*:ich was probably
the most important gathering of its kind since the Congress of
Vienna, marked the zenith of Beaconsf i eld ' s career, "The general
voice of the plenipotentiaries would readily have echoed, before
they sat many days, the historical words in which Biemarck expressed
his own estimate Der alte Jude, dae ist der Mann' ".1
The British plenipotentiaries proceeded to the scene of
their labors prepared as no other delegates at the Congress were pi&-
pared. They were on good terms with Prance and Italy and had
achieved an understanding with Austria, whose geographical position
gave her an enormous influence in Balks.n arrangements. Moreover,
England had concluded a secret agreement with Russia and another
iBuckle Vol, VI p,311
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rrith Turkey, Russia's defeated foe.
By the agreement with Russia, known as the SalishuryT
Schouvalof Memorandum, the two powers agreed upon the hroad lines
of a settlement, mutually acceptable. Under the Memorandum, Russia
made a fairly complete surrender of the "Big Bulgaria", which was
the outstanding feature of the Treaty of San Stefano. She consented
to the exclusion of Bulgaria from the Aegean Coast; to the recti-
fication of its proposed western frontier upon the hasis of national-
ities, so as to exclude non-Bulgarian populations and to the divi-
sion of Bulgaria into two provinces, separated hy the Balkan ranges,
of which only the province north of the Balkans should have political
autonomy under the Government of a Prince, v/hile that south of the
Balkans should receive a large measure of administrative self govern-
ment, with a Christian Governor. England reserved to itself the
right to insist at the Congress that the Sultan "be allowed to
canton troops on the frontiers of southern Bulgaria, a proposition
as to which Russia also reserved complete liberty for herself in
the Congress discussion. Russia's acquisition of Bessarabia was
to be allowed to stand. Great Britain was to have a voice, as v;ell
as Russia, in determining the future organization of Thessaly,
Epirus and other Christian provinces of European Turkey.^
The Cyprus Convention with the Porte, signed by Layard
and Safvet Pasha at Constantinople on the eve of the Congress,
June 4, was comparatively short. It provided that in the event
or
Russia insisted on retaining Kars, Eatum, Ardahan,^any of them,
1
Buckle Vol VI pp. 295-296
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the British Government would defend "by force of arms the Sultan's
Asiatic dominions, as they might be fixed hy Congress, against
Russian attack. In return, the Sultan undertook to introduce
reform to be agreed upon later betv/een the two Powers, into the
Government of these territories and the protection of the Christian
and although subjects of the Porte. Turkey further assigned the
island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England in
order that she might be in a position to execute these engagements.
Lord Beaconsf ield , ^-hen this secret engagement v/ith Turkey
had become known, had suggested to France that England would not
interfere in the event that France wanted to occupy Tunis. Lord
Lyons claimed this was the first of a series of misunderstanding
betv/een France and England, Gladstone expressed his opinion of the
Anglo-Turkish Convention in the following words, "I think we have
greatly lost by conclusion of this Anglo-Turkish Convention. I
think we have lost very greatly indeed the sympathy and respect of
the nations of Europe. This setting up of interests out of place
beyond their proper sphere has greatly diminished our moral position
in the world,
As we have before stated, never did a Power attend a Con-
gress of Great Powers ae v;ell-f ortif ied by prior treaty guarantees
as did Great Britain entering the Congress of Berlin. During the
proceedings^ Great Britain and Austria worked together, and France
and Italy, alike distrustful of Russia's ambitions to become a
Mediterranean power, usually supported them.
The British Government was still obsessed with the tradi-
tional policy of maintaining the independence and territorial in-




Morley Vol. II p. 578
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love of the Turks, "but because the vital needs of the British Empire
were supposed to require it. It was obvious froiji the Salisbury
Circular that the aim of Great Britain was to preserve for Turkey
a compact and considerable territory and to prevent Russia from
securing a territorial re-arrangement that would place Turkey at
her mercy and would give her control of Constantinople, the Straits,
the Black Sea and the route to the Persian Gulf.
Austria, on the other hand, was eager to make acquisitions
and also ambitious to substitute itself for Russia as the dominant
Power in the Balkans,
Germany, truf to Bismarck's promise played the part of
"honest broker". His chief concern was that Turkey should not
repeat the fiasco of the Constantinople Conference and the Turkish
delegates soon learned that they had come to Berlin not to "carry
on negotiations but to accept dictation". The Congress sat just one
month and ended its deliberations on July 15, 1878, Its brief dura-
tion is very easily explained tfy Bismarck's methods as President,
which were drastically businesslike.
The final results of the Treaty which, in reality, simply
gave concrete form to the general principles affirmed in the Anglo-
Russian Convention were as follows: (l) !Big Bulgaria"v.'as to be
denlt with in this manner; the territory between the Danube and the
Balkan range was to be an autonoiaouB'^ state under suzerainity of the
Sultan, (with a prini3e elected by the people); the territory immedi-
ately south of the Balkan range, to be called East Roumelia, was
conceded administrative autonomy under a Christian Governor; the
part bordering on the Aegean Sea was to be restored to the Porte
subject to conditions for b.e.t-^ei:,9.d]3iini strati on equally with other




Turkish provinces in Europe, This part has since "been generally
spoken of as Macedonia. (2) Austria received a mandate empowering
her to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina subject to
Turkish suzerainty^ the sandyak of Novi-Eazar to "be garrisoned hy
Austria. (3) Servia was to receive full independence with an
increase of territory, but was refused access to the Adriatic,
(4) Montenegro wa? also to become a Sovereign state and was doubled
in size with an outlet to the sea, (5) Roumania was declared
independent but was required to return the Bessarabian territory
which had been transferred from Russia to Moldavia in 1H56, She
was assigned, instead, the sterile tract of the Dobrud;ja, inhabited
by an alien population, (6) As for Greece, the Powers urged on the
Porte a rectification of the frontier in Thessaly and Epirus. (7)
In Asiatic Turkey, Russia acquired Ardahan, Kars and Batoum but
renounced the acquisition of Erzerun and Bayezid. (8) The Porte
was bound to introduce reform into Armenia- withtout further loss of
time. The measures adopted were to be announced periodically to
the Powers appointed to supervise the execution of these reforms.
In closing the Congress on July 13, Bismarck paid a tri-
bute to the spirit of conciliation and good will which had animated
all the plenipotentiaries. On the whole, the Treaty of Berlin may
be fairly claimed to be a triumph for British policy and Beacons-
field was able to return to England claiming that he had brought
back from Berlin, "Peace vdth Honor".
Gladstone expressed his satisfaction over the Treaty in
the following words: "Taking the whole of the provisions of the
treaty together, I most thankfully acknowledge that great results
have been achieved in the diminution of human misery and towards
rn
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the establishment of human happiness and prosperity in the East".
Gladstone, however, was dissatisfied with many of the provisions
of the treaty, especially in regard to Bosnia, Herzegovina and
Eouraania. ^
The only important outstanding difference in practically
the whole proceedings of the Congress of Berlin was loetv/een Great
Britain and Russia as to whether the Turks should or should not have
the right to keep an army in East Roumelia. Great Britain made the
Turkish claim her own and expressed readiness to go to war if Rus-
sia did not yield. Bismarck, who wanted a peaceful solution was
alarmed, Beaconsfield had ordered a special train to "be in readi-
ness to take the British mission back to Calais, had packed his
trunks and let all Berlin know about it. Bi8:narck had to find out
if Beaconsfield was bluffing and accordingly invited the latter to
dinner. As Beaconsfield himself described the situation, "He (Bis-
marck) smoked and I followed. I believe I gave the last blow to
shattered constitution, but I felt it absolutely necessary -- he was
convinced that the ultimatum was not a sham and before I went to bed,
I had the satisfaction of knowing that St, Petersburg had surrendered?
Gortchakoff, however, left the Congress with bitter feel-
ings against Bismarck, yfhom he felt had betrayed Russian interests
and had been guilty of unpardonable ingratitude in view of Russia's
benevolent neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck
attempted to justify his attitude and actions throughout the Congress
by the reply that no wish was expressed by Russia at the Congre??s of
Berlin which he would not have proposed for acceptance had the cir-
cumstances required,
3
^The Berlin Treaty and Anglo-Turkish Convention - Gladstone
^Buckle Vol. VI p, 324
•^Bismarck's Reflections Vol. Ill pp. 117-118
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Although dissatisfaction was expressed in many quarters
over the results of the Treaty of Berlin, nevertheless there is
no doubt that it averted from the Balkan states and provinces the
horrors of a future conflict hetv/een Russia and Turkey; it re-
moved many abuses and wrongs which had long and vainly cried for
remedy and it alleviated the hard yoke of Ottoman rule over about
eleven million people. The diplomats at Berlin improved upon the
Russian treaty in two important respects, namely; first, in se-
curing for all the Powers, instead of Russia alone, the right of
watching over, and assisting in, the execution of the new arrange-
ments in the Balkans, and secondly in imposing, with greater em-
phasis and stronger guarantees, the principle of religious liberty.
Apart from these two restrictions, all the good things
in the Treaty of Berlin were simply the confirmation, grudgingly
given, of the provisions of San Stefano,
The underlying motive in the case of most of the negotiat-
ing Powers was not the humantarian idea, but the idea of political
expediency. The interests of the Great ewers in the Balkans were
considered, not the desires and needs of the small states most
vitally concerned. Had the Powers been actuated only by disinter-
estedness, moderation and foresight, they would then have assembled
in Congress resolved to confirm the essential arrangements of San
Stefano,
The principal achievement of British diplomacy at the
Congress of Berlin was the fiontinued dismemberment of the Bulgarian
rsces. The British plenipotentiaries, in order to thwart Russia,
considered their own interests before those of the populations
affected. Lord Beaconsfield and Count Andrassy insisted on splitting

Bulgaria, into three parts in order to insure the existence of a
strong Turkey, but when Greece suggested that she might help Turkey
by receiving some of her territory, she was informed that it was
not the intention of the Congress to partition the Ottoinan Empire,
At this Congress it was the interests of the Great Powers
that took precedence over every other consideration. "The great
fault of the Congress of Berlin was the failure to recognize that
the peace of Europe is not insured, nor the interests of any Power
permanently served, by creating unnatural, unjust and intolerable
conditions; the failure to recognize that in the long run, justice
is the surest foundation of states and nations,
The whole of Lord Salisbury's arguments were based on the
assumption that the Bulgarians were incapable of asserting their
independence and he feared that she would fall from the tyranny of
the Turks, into the grip of the Muscovite; but future events have
shown that his premise was false. Close observers of the Bulgars
during the war might have noticed that the "little brother" whom
the Russians had come to free, were very glad for freedom, but had
no desire to exchange one despotism for another, even though the
latter were Orthodox and Slavonic. "Liberated nation, wrote Bis-
marck, are not grateful, but exacting."
Prince Bismarck had noted the Bulgar's independent character
for he told Lord Salisbury at Berlin that he did not think Russia
would ever attempt to hold Bulgaria, because it was "an alien popu-
lation v^ich she could not absorb**? Also one eminent British diplomat
^Three Peace ^©nferences, page 68
^Lady G. Cecil Vol. II p. 103
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truly conprehended the situation. Lord Lyons writing from his
embassy in Paris on February 28, 1878 said that, "if anything
like a national feeling and a national government can be developed
in her (Bulgaria) -— Russia will "become their natural enemy,
Lord Salisbury did not realize the force of nationality
among the Bulgars, "T^ich would insist alike on independence from
Pwussia and on a national union. They were no more likely to tol-
erate indefinitely the tutelage of Russia than that of the Turks,
The fact that within seven years, Bulgaria had violated the Treaty
and had absorbed East Roumelia shows the strong force of Bulgarian
nati onali ty
.
Although the Treaty of Berlin preserved the peace of
Europe for thirty-five years, nevertheless it has not proved in
any sense to be a permanent settlement of an "eternal question".
It has not secured the peace of the Balkan pennisula, it did not
insure the just treatment of the Christian races which it left
under Turkish rule. Furthermore, almost every Signatory Power
and more than one small state has violated some provision of this
solemn international instrument: Turkey
,
by doing nothing to re-
form the lot of the Macedonian and Armenian populations, nor did
the Great Powers force her to respect the Treaty in this regard --
the frightful massacre of the Armenians which began in 1894 went
on undistrubed, without the Powers troubling themselves about it;
Russia
,




l^ewton Vol. II p. 369
r
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Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria TDy declaring her independence
and absorbing East Roumelia.
In addition to the fact that many of the provisions of
the Treaty were broken, there were; what one might call, almost vital
defects in it; the partitioning among the Pov/ers of some of the
territories of the Balkan peoples and the restoration of Turkish
rule in the more debatable regions. This aggravated instead of
soothed the elements of conflict in the Balkans. The Great Powers
rere brought into collision vdth the Balkan peoples and the latter
were left in conflict with themselves and with Turkey; Bosnia and
Herzegovina, admini pstered by Austria, gave the latter an outlet to
the Aegean Sea and this v/as the beginning of the penetration by
Austria of the Balkan pennisula, Austria, thus, became a rival
to Russia for influence in the Balkans and one of the connecting
links between Balkan troubles and a European war.
By failing to recognize Servia's claim to some of the
territory handed over to Austria, the former directed her attention
toward Macedonia and became Bulgaria's bitter enemy over that dis-
puted territory.
By the Treaty of Berlin, the interests of Roumania were
sacrificed to Russia, whom she had aided materially in the war, Bes-
sarabia^ which was inhabited by Roumani an^ ,was taken from her by
Russia who therby gained access to the mouth of the Danube. In ex-
change, Roumania received the sterile district aC Dobrudia, which
she did not want. Roumanians reward for its assistance to Russia
was first to be enclosed between Russia and Sig Bulgaria"by the Treaty
of San Stefano, and then to pay for the cutting up of Big Bulgaria
by British diplomacy, was cut up to compensate Russia, The Roumanian
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envoys left Berlin, not only empty-handed, iDut bitterly chagrinedc).
at the ingratitude of Russia and the indifference of the Great
Powers, No douht tiie remembrance of this unjust treatment helps
to explain why Roumania was so late in entering the World War
on the side of the Allies,
The most fundamental defect of the v«hole treaty of Berlin,
however, was the splitting up of Big Bulgaria into three partr,, with
the resultant "Macedonian (Question" which has been, and still is, the
most bitterly disputed territory in the Balkans. Macedonia has be-
come the arena for Balkan racial and social warfare and a focus of
infection for European political war fever.
The Macedonian (Question can be laid squarely at the doors
of the Great Powers and their diplomatic juggling. It has been
and still is a cause of friction betv/een small states and Great Powers
a potential cause of international 'hostilities, the scene of misrule,
internecine strife and finally war.
The Trec.ty of San Stefano had brought the Balkan situation
to its only logical conclusion. The frontiers of the Slav peoples
were laid down with great oarticulari ty and with a close and con-
scientious regard for . et--Oological and geographical considerations.
The Russian settlement of che Macedonian Question was both complete
and conformable to all the interests involved, but this fact seems
to have been obsured and overlooked through the opposition to it of
Disraeli and the diplomatic policy of the Government.
Beaconsfieid felt that if Russia were allov/ed to have her
way' and the Treaty of San Stefano allowed to stand, it wou. d have
been a disgusied encroachment of Russia, a falsification oi the
c
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weights in the "balance of power, and a mine dug under the TDuffer
states Y^iich serve as a natural bulwark to Constantinople,
This may, indeed, have been the intention of Russian di-
plomacy, "but if Russian diplomats thought they could Russify Bul-
garia, British diplomats may be excused for not knowing any "better.
But the point is, that had the Russian and British diplomacy been
contented with the simpler policy of dealing with the Balkan situa-
tion, according to the dictates of coimnon sense and justice, it
would have been far better both for their own countries and civili-
zation, '^at is most important of all, had this nolicy been followed,
there might not have been a cataclysmic upheaval less than half a
century later which threatened to engulf the whole of the civilized
world.
The Congress of Berlin has often been spoken of as a land-
mark in the history of the Eastern Q,uef5tion. The importance of the
Treaty of Berlin lies not only in its relation to the Great War, Its
enduring significance may be found in the birth of new nations which
arase from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. "Nations which look
back to the 13th of July, 1878, if not as their birthday, at least
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